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Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania; 
ERIC ROLLINS, in official capacity as Executive Director of 
the Erie County Assistance Office, 
 
           Appellants 
_____________ 
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  OPINION 
________________  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge, 
I 
This case involves the interaction between state and 
federal law under the Medicaid system, a cooperative 
program between the state and federal governments to 
provide medical assistance to those with limited financial 
resources.  Seeking to stamp out abusive manipulation of 
trusts to hide assets and thereby manufacture Medicaid 
eligibility, Congress created a comprehensive system of rules 
mandating that trusts be counted as assets.  But Congress also 
exempted from these rules certain trusts intended to provide 
disabled individuals with necessities and comforts not 
covered by Medicaid.  Seeking to ensure that these trusts 
were not abused, Pennsylvania enacted Section 9 of 
Pennsylvania Act 42 of 2005, codified at 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 
1414 (Section 1414), to regulate these special needs trusts.   
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Plaintiffs brought a putative class action in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania challenging Section 1414‟s validity.  
Plaintiffs allege Section 1414 is preempted by the federal 
statute governing Medicaid eligibility, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(d)(4).  They seek injunctive and declaratory relief 
barring its enforcement.  The District Court granted that 
relief, holding all but one of the challenged provisions of 
Section 1414 preempted.  In reaching that holding, the 
District Court concluded that Plaintiffs‟ case was justiciable 
and that Plaintiffs had a private right of action under both 
Section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause.  The District Court 
also held that Section 1414 was severable, certified a class of 
plaintiffs, and appointed class counsel. 
This appeal followed.  The parties do not challenge the 
District Court‟s decision to uphold the remaining provision of 
Section 1414 or the District Court‟s decisions on severability, 
certification, and appointment of class counsel.  We conclude 
that Plaintiffs‟ case is justiciable and that they have a private 
right of action under both Section 1983 and the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution.  On the merits of Plaintiffs‟ 
challenge, we conclude that the District Court was correct in 
its determination that Section 1414‟s 50% repayment 
provision, “special needs” provision, expenditure provision, 
and age restriction are all preempted by federal law.  
However, we conclude that the enforcement provision of 
Section 1414 – when used to enforce provisions not otherwise 
preempted by federal law – is a reasonable exercise of the 
Commonwealth‟s retained authority to regulate trusts.  We 
will affirm in part and reverse in part. 
II 
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Medicaid is a joint federal-state program providing 
medical assistance to the needy.
1
  Enacted under Congress‟ 
Spending Clause authority, Medicaid is voluntary.  No State 
is obligated to join Medicaid, but if they do join, they are 
subject to federal regulations governing its administration.  
See Roloff v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1992).  
Pennsylvania has elected to participate in Medicaid. 
Generally, Medicaid provides assistance for two types 
of individuals:  the categorically needy and the medically 
needy.  The categorically needy are those who qualify for 
public assistance under the Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program or other federal programs.  See Roach v. 
Morse, 440 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.); 
Roloff, 975 F.2d at 335.  The medically needy are those who 
would qualify as categorically needy (because they are 
disabled, etc.) but whose income and/or assets are substantial 
                                              
1
 The Supreme Court has noted, echoing Judge Friendly, 
that Medicaid‟s “Byzantine construction . . . makes the 
Act „almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.‟”  Schweiker 
v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) (quoting 
Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 
1976)).  The District Court in Friedman, which the 
Supreme Court quoted, was even more direct:  “The 
Medicaid statute . . . is an aggravated assault on the 
English language, resistant to attempts to understand it.”  
Friedman v. Berger, 409 F. Supp. 1225, 1225-26 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), quoted by Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 43 
n.14. 
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enough to disqualify them.  Roloff, 975 F.2d at 335.
2
  Every 
State participating in Medicaid must provide assistance to the 
categorically needy.  States need not provide assistance to the 
medically needy.  See id.  If States choose to make medical 
assistance available to the medically needy, they are subject 
to various statutory restrictions in determining to whom 
medical assistance should be extended. 
 Congress has created a comprehensive system of asset-
counting rules for determining who qualifies for Medicaid.  
Under Medicaid‟s original asset-counting rules, individuals 
could put large sums of money in trust, thereby vesting legal 
title to those assets in the trust and reducing (on paper) the 
amount of assets owned by the individual. 
A trust is a legal instrument in which assets are held in 
the name of the trust and managed by a trustee for the benefit 
of a beneficiary.  Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (8th ed. 2004) 
(definition of “trust”).  This structure means that the 
beneficiary does not actually own the assets of the trust, but 
                                              
2
 “[T]he medically needy may qualify for financial 
assistance for medical expenses if they incur such 
expenses in an amount that effectively reduces their 
income to the eligibility level. Only when they „spend 
down‟ the amount by which their income exceeds that 
level, are they in roughly the same position as [the 
categorically needy]:  any further expenditures for 
medical expenses then would have to come from funds 
required for basic necessities.”  Atkins v. Rivera, 477 
U.S. 154, 158 (1986) (footnote and citation omitted). 
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instead has an equitable right to derive benefits from them.  
(The benefits vary according to the terms of the trust.)  The 
trust has long been a tool for evading the rigid strictures of 
the law, which has generally been a positive development.  
For example, in feudal England – the trust‟s birthplace – the 
trust allowed younger sons and daughters to inherit land 
despite strict rules at law against devising land by will.  See 
Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People 
with Disabilities:  The Development of a Private Trust in the 
Public Interest, 10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 91, 101 (2000) (citing 
Austin Wakeman Scott, Abridgment of the Law of Trusts 11 
(1960)).  And the trust‟s unique structure makes it useful for 
countless salutary purposes in modern society. 
 But this same bifurcated ownership structure has been 
used to manufacture eligibility for government welfare 
programs like Medicaid.  As with many government 
programs, eligibility for Medicaid is partially dependent on 
the claimant‟s income and assets.  Wealthy individuals are 
expected to exhaust their own resources before turning to the 
public for assistance.  But trusts can enable these same 
individuals to technically “own” nothing at all, even though 
they may have access to substantial wealth.  Such claimants 
may then qualify for Medicaid.  See Johnson v. Guhl, 357 
F.3d 403, 405 (3d. Cir. 2004) (“Because Medicaid is available 
to the needy, creative lawyers and financial planners have 
devised various ways to „shield‟ wealthier claimants‟ assets in 
determining Medicaid eligibility.”).  Individuals have gained 
access to taxpayer-funded healthcare while retaining the 
benefit of their wealth and the ability to pass that wealth to 
their heirs. 
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Congress understandably viewed this as an abuse and 
began addressing the problem with statutory standards 
enacted in 1986.  See Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9506(a), 
100 Stat. 82 (Apr. 7, 1986).  These standards were repealed 
and replaced in 1993 by the current trust-counting rules.  See 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-66, Title XIII § 13611(d)(1)(c), 107 Stat. 312 (Aug. 10, 
1993) (OBRA 1993).  Those rules are at issue in this case. 
 In the 1993 OBRA amendments, Congress established 
a general rule that trusts would be counted as assets for the 
purpose of determining Medicaid eligibility.  But Congress 
also excepted from that rule three types of trusts meeting 
certain specific requirements.  Taken together, these are 
generally called “special needs trusts” or “supplemental needs 
trusts.”  “A supplemental needs trust is a discretionary trust 
established for the benefit of a person with a severe and 
chronic or persistent disability and is intended to provide for 
expenses that assistance programs such as Medicaid do not 
cover.”  Sullivan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 174 F.3d 282, 284 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).  These 
expenses – books, television, Internet, travel, and even such 
necessities as clothing and toiletries – would rarely be 
considered extravagant. 
One type of special needs trust – the one at issue in 
this case – is the pooled special needs trust.  “A „pooled trust‟ 
is a special arrangement with a non-profit organization that 
serves as trustee to manage assets belonging to many disabled 
individuals, with investments being pooled, but with separate 
trust „accounts‟ being maintained for each disabled 
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individual.”  Jan P. Myskowski, Special Needs Trusts in the 
Era of the Uniform Trust Code, 46 N.H. Bar J., Spring 2005, 
at 16.  The pooled special needs trust was intended for 
individuals with a relatively small amount of money.  By 
pooling these small accounts for investment and management 
purposes, overhead and expenses are reduced and more 
money is available to the beneficiary. 
 The Medicaid statute says the following regarding 
pooled trusts: 
(4) This subsection [the rules counting trusts as 
available assets for purposes of Medicaid 
eligibility] shall not apply to any of the 
following trusts: 
   . . . . 
(C) A trust containing the assets of an 
individual who is disabled (as defined in 
section 1382c(a)(3) of this title) that 
meets the following conditions: 
 (i) The trust is established and 
managed by a non-profit 
association. 
 (ii) A separate account is 
maintained for each beneficiary of 
the trust, but, for purposes of 
investment and management of 
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funds, the trust pools these 
accounts. 
 (iii) Accounts in the trust are 
established solely for the benefit 
of individuals who are disabled 
(as defined in section 1382c(a)(3) 
of this title) by the parent, 
grandparent, or legal guardian of 
such individuals, by such 
individuals, or by a court. 
 (iv) To the extent that amounts 
remaining in the beneficiary‟s 
account upon the death of the 
beneficiary are not retained by the 
trust, the trust pays to the State 
from such remaining amounts in 
the account an amount equal to 
the total amount of medical 
assistance paid on behalf of the 
beneficiary under the State plan 
under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4). 
 In 2005, Pennsylvania sought to regulate pooled trusts 
(and special needs trusts more generally) by passing Section 
1414, which states: 
Section 1414.  Special Needs Trusts. – 
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(a) A special needs trust must be approved by a 
court of competent jurisdiction if required by 
rules of court. 
(b) A special needs trust shall comply with all 
of the following: 
 (1) The beneficiary shall be an individual 
under the age of sixty-five who is 
disabled, as that term is defined in Title 
XVI of the Social Security Act (49 Stat. 
620, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.) 
 (2) The beneficiary shall have special 
needs that will not be met without the 
trust. 
 (3) The trust shall provide: 
(i) That all distributions from the 
trust must be for the sole benefit 
of the beneficiary. 
(ii) That any expenditure from the 
trust must have a reasonable 
relationship to the needs of the 
beneficiary. 
(iii) That, upon the death of the 
beneficiary or upon the earlier 
termination of the trust, the 
department and any other state 
that provided medical assistance 
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to the beneficiary must be 
reimbursed from the funds 
remaining in the trust up to an 
amount equal to the total medical 
assistance paid on behalf of the 
beneficiary before any other 
claimant is paid: Provided, 
however, That in the case of an 
account in a pooled trust, the trust 
shall provide that no more than 
fifty percent of the amount 
remaining in the beneficiary‟s 
pooled trust account may be 
retained by the trust without any 
obligation to reimburse the 
department. 
    . . . . 
 (c) If at any time it appears that any of the 
requirements of subsection (b) are not satisfied 
or the trustee refuses without good cause to 
make payments from the trust for the special 
needs of the beneficiary and, provided that the 
department or any other public agency in this 
Commonwealth has a claim against trust 
property, the department or other public agency 
may petition the court for an order terminating 
the trust. 
   . . . . 
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(f) As used in this section, the following words 
and phrases shall have the following meanings: 
    . . . . 
“Special needs” means those items, products or 
services not covered by the medical assistance 
program, insurance or other third-party liability 
source for which a beneficiary of a special 
needs trust or his parents are personally liable 
and that can be provided to the beneficiary to 
increase the beneficiary‟s quality of life and to 
assist in and are related to the treatment of the 
beneficiary‟s disability.  The term may include 
medical expenses, dental expenses, recreational 
therapy, occupational therapy, physical therapy, 
vocational therapy, durable medical needs, 
prosthetic devices, special rehabilitative 
services or equipment, disability-related 
training, education, transportation and travel 
expenses, dietary needs and supplements, 
related insurance and other goods and services 
specified by the department. 
62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414. 
Plaintiffs challenge Section 1414 as preempted by the 
Medicaid statute.  Stripped down to its essentials, their 
argument is that the requirements for a pooled special needs 
trust are set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4), that those are 
the only requirements, and that Section 1414‟s attempt to 
graft additional requirements onto pooled special needs trusts 
14 
 
is not permissible.  The District Court agreed.  For the most 
part, we agree as well.  We part company with the District 
Court only insofar as we believe it gave insufficient weight to 
Pennsylvania‟s retained authority to regulate trusts. 
III 
There are two types of named plaintiffs in this 
proposed class action:  the Individual Plaintiffs and the Trust 
Plaintiffs.
3
  The Individual Plaintiffs are Zackery Lewis, 
Richard Young, Lynn Hainer, Susan Coleman, Kathy Burger, 
Tracy Palmer, Kenny Atkinson, Bernice Tate, Mary Wagner, 
Michael Bidzilya, William Algar, and Anthony Gale.  With 
the exception of Lynn Hainer, all the Individual Plaintiffs are 
domiciled in the State of Pennsylvania, are disabled, and have 
received medical assistance under Medicaid.
4
  Lynn Hainer 
brings suit as administratix for the estate of her deceased 
niece Addie Smith.  At the time of her death, Addie was 
domiciled in Pennsylvania, disabled, and receiving medical 
                                              
3
 The parties have stipulated to the facts.  The stipulation 
was filed with the District Court in advance of the motion 
for summary judgment.  We have seen nothing in the 
record to suggest that we lack jurisdiction or that the 
stipulation is obviously inaccurate in any other respect.  
We accept it as true for the purposes of this appeal and 
have included relevant facts below. 
 
4
 Kenny Atkinson and Bernice Tate passed away during 
the pendency of this suit. 
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assistance through Medicaid.  The Individual Plaintiffs all 
have accounts in pooled trusts, with balances ranging from $0 
(Richard Young)
5
 to $1.26 million (Zackery Lewis).
6
  In 
general, the Individual Plaintiffs‟ balances are quite low, 
usually a few hundred to a few thousand dollars.  The 
Individual Plaintiffs use or intend to use the balances in their 
accounts for a variety of purposes, including personal items, 
furnishings, therapy sessions, cell phone and cable service, 
and travel expenses.  With the exception of Michael Bidzilya  
and William Algar, who at the time of filing were 80 years 
old and 69 years old respectively, all the individual plaintiffs 
are under the age of 65.  (At the time of her death, Addie 
Smith was 72 years old.) 
The Trust Plaintiffs are ARC-CT (ARC) and The 
Family Trust.  ARC is a charitable organization managing 
trust accounts, with approximately $23 million in funds under 
management.  It currently manages approximately 117 pooled 
trust accounts.  It has managed approximately 130 pooled 
trust accounts since its inception.  All its trust beneficiaries 
                                              
5
 Richard Young exhausted his account, but continues to 
be paid benefits from account funds retained by the trust 
after the deaths of the respective account beneficiaries.  
He appears to be the only Plaintiff with such an 
arrangement. 
 
6
 The current balance in Lewis‟ account is not provided 
in the stipulation, but it is being funded with annuities 
purchased from the $1.26 million net proceeds of a 
settlement reached in a medical malpractice lawsuit. 
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are disabled, Medicaid-eligible individuals.  It does not open 
pooled trust accounts for beneficiaries over the age of 65. 
Disabled individuals seeking to establish an account in 
ARC‟s pooled trust sign an agreement providing that the 
trustee has sole discretion in disbursing funds and will do so 
for the beneficiary‟s “supplemental and life enhancing needs 
and care.”  The agreement further provides that the trustee 
“may interpret liberally the term „supplemental needs‟ but all 
distributions shall be made solely for the benefit of the 
disabled beneficiary.”  ARC has not approved the use of trust 
funds for luxury items and Pennsylvania has never informed 
ARC that any of its expenditures are unallowable. 
Prior to enactment of Section 1414, ARC‟s agreements 
provided that all funds in trust would be retained by ARC 
upon the death of the beneficiary and would be used for the 
benefit of other beneficiaries.  In 2002, the Social Security 
Administration and the Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare (DPW) informed ARC that its trust documents met 
the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C).  Following 
the enactment of Section 1414, DPW informed ARC that its 
trust agreements did not comply with the new Pennsylvania 
statute.  In response, ARC amended its trust agreements to 
provide that funds would be retained “to the maximum extent 
allowed by law.”  Since enactment of Section 1414, ARC has 
retained the funds in the accounts of several deceased 
beneficiaries and paid some of those funds out for the benefit 
of other beneficiaries.  In 2006, Pennsylvania sought a portion 
of the funds retained by ARC following the death of Thomas 
Johnstone, but it has since withdrawn that request. 
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The Family Trust is a charitable organization 
managing trust accounts, with approximately $20 million in 
funds under management.  It currently manages 
approximately 1,122 pooled trust accounts.  It has managed 
approximately 1,248 pooled trust accounts since its inception.  
Unlike ARC, the Family Trust does open pooled trust 
accounts for beneficiaries over the age of 65, with fourteen 
individuals permitted to do so since the enactment of Section 
1414.  All of The Family Trust‟s beneficiaries are disabled, 
Medicaid-eligible individuals. 
Disabled individuals seeking to establish an account in 
the pooled trust sign an agreement providing that the trustee 
has sole discretion in disbursing funds and will do so for the 
beneficiary‟s “extra and supplemental care.”  When the 
Family Trust inquired whether it was permitted to use funds 
in a beneficiary‟s account to pay for her funeral expenses, it 
was informed that it was not permitted to do so. 
The Family Trust‟s agreements provide that all funds 
in trust are retained by The Family Trust upon the death of 
the beneficiary and used to provide “support for individuals 
with disabilities to live safe, meaningful and productive 
lives.”  The Family Trust has used retained funds for general 
charitable purposes, not solely for other beneficiaries of its 
trust accounts.  In 2000, DPW informed The Family Trust 
that its trust documents met the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(d)(4)(C).
7
   
                                              
7
 While we intend to cast no aspersions on The Family 
Trust, its stewardship of funds has been questioned.  For 
18 
 
Gary Alexander is the Secretary of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Public Welfare.  The DPW is charged with 
administration of the State‟s Medicaid program.  It is also 
responsible for reviewing special needs trusts and for 
promulgating “regulations or statements of policy . . . to 
implement” Section 1414.  62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414(b)(4).  
The DPW operates county assistance offices throughout the 
Commonwealth to serve the citizens of Pennsylvania.  Eric 
Rollins is the Executive Director of the Erie County 
Assistance Office.  Both Mr. Alexander and Mr. Rollins are 
defendants in this suit, having been sued in their official 
capacities. 
Following the enactment of Section 1414, DPW 
sought to terminate the medical assistance of Mary Wagner 
by asserting that assets she had transferred to the trust could 
not be exempted because The Family Trust‟s trust agreements 
did not comply with Section 1414.  In addition, DPW has 
objected to Kenny Atkinson and Bernice Tate‟s participation 
in The Family Trust based upon The Family Trust‟s failure to 
conform its agreements to  Section 1414.  DPW has not 
                                                                                                     
example, the Family Trust approved the use of trust 
funds for the purchase of a new home by the family of 
Zachery Lewis.  Though the disbursement was in the 
amount calculated by the trust to provide for necessary 
safety features for the home, neither Zachery Lewis nor 
The Family Trust retained a security interest in the home.    
On the other hand, in a different case, The Family Trust 
refused to approve the use of funds to purchase a Jaguar 
automobile. 
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otherwise challenged the medical assistance eligibility of any 
individuals, terminated the medical assistance of any 
beneficiary, or attempted to block disbursements for failure to 
conform to Section 1414.  But DPW stipulates that should it 
“prevail in this litigation, it will enforce all provisions of 
section 1414[.]”  Also, DPW has “directed all pooled trusts in 
Pennsylvania to amend their master trust[] agreements and 
joinder agreements to conform to the requirements of section 
1414.” 
DPW has not promulgated official regulations or 
issued formal guidance regarding its interpretation of Section 
1414.  But it did create and circulate a document on Special 
Needs Trusts to DPW attorneys and County Assistance 
Offices. 
IV 
Plaintiffs brought a putative class action in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania before Judge Jan E. Dubois, 
challenging the validity of Section 1414 and seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief barring its enforcement.  The 
original defendants included a host of state officials 
(including the Governor of Pennsylvania, Attorney General of 
Pennsylvania, and others) purportedly charged with enforcing 
Section 1414.  By opinion dated August 3, 2007, the District 
Court dismissed the claims against all individuals except the 
Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare 
and the Executive Director of the Erie County Assistance 
Office.  It concluded that the Complaint adequately alleged 
that these two individuals had actually attempted to enforce 
Section 1414.  In the same opinion, the District Court 
20 
 
dismissed substantive and procedural due process claims 
made by the plaintiffs.
8
  None of these decisions appears to be 
challenged, except insofar as Defendants continue to 
challenge the justiciability of Plaintiffs‟ claims. 
After discovery and submission of stipulated facts, 
cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by the 
parties.  In a thorough and carefully-considered opinion, the 
District Court granted Plaintiffs‟ motion for summary 
judgment almost in its entirety, holding that all but one of the 
challenged provisions of Section 1414 are preempted by 
federal law.
9
  However, the District Court concluded that the 
offending provisions could be severed from the remainder of 
the law, and thus did not strike down Section 1414 in its 
                                              
8
 The District Court deferred consideration of one portion 
of the procedural due process claim until the summary 
judgment stage, at which point it concluded the claim 
was moot due to its determination that the challenged 
portions of Section 1414 were preempted.  Given our 
reversal of the District Court‟s judgment with regard to 
the enforcement clause, the District Court is free to 
revisit this ruling on remand.  We express no opinion on 
the merits of the claim. 
 
9
 The District Court concluded that the requirement of 
Section 1414(b)(3)(i) that “all distributions from the trust 
must be for the sole benefit of the beneficiary” mirrored 
federal law and was not preempted. 
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entirety.  The District Court also certified a (b)(2) class action 
and appointed class counsel. 
On appeal, Defendants challenge the justiciability of 
Plaintiffs‟ claims, their ability to bring a private right of 
action, and the District Court‟s judgment that Section 1414 is 
preempted by federal law.   
V.A.1 
Constitutional standing “is an essential and 
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of 
Article III.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992).  Reduced to its constitutional minimum, standing 
requires three elements:  (1) an injury in fact consisting of an 
actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest; (2) 
a causal connection between the injury in fact and the 
Defendants‟ conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision.  See id. at 560-61.  “The 
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 
establishing these elements.”  Id. at 561. 
Defendants‟ only challenge is to whether Plaintiffs 
have an injury in fact.
10
  Defendants note several provisions 
                                              
10
 Because constitutional standing is a jurisdictional 
requirement, “[w]e are obliged to examine standing sua 
sponte where standing has erroneously been assumed 
below.”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 
103, 110 (2001).  Thus, our examination is not confined 
to those arguments raised by the Defendants.  But the 
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of the law that they have allegedly never attempted to 
enforce.  They particularly rely on arguments that:  (1) they 
have never challenged trust disbursements under the 
expenditure provision of Section 1414(b)(3)(ii) (“any 
expenditure from the trust must have a reasonable 
relationship to the needs of the beneficiary”); and (2) they 
have never denied eligibility to form or maintain a trust based 
on the special needs provision of Section 1414(b)(2) (“The 
beneficiary shall have special needs that will not be met 
without the trust.”)  (Appellants‟ Principal Br. at 14) 
Because the provisions of Section 1414 are 
severable,
11
 we must analyze each provision independently 
for the purposes of determining whether the Plaintiffs have 
standing to challenge that particular provision.  See 
Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 
                                                                                                     
District Court concluded – and we agree – that the causal 
connection and redressability prongs are satisfied 
because “[t]he injuries alleged by plaintiffs are a direct 
result of Section 1414 and its impending enforcement by 
defendants, and declaratory and injunctive relief would 
eliminate the risk of such injury.” 
 
11
 The District Court did a comprehensive severability 
analysis and concluded that the statute is severable.  The 
parties have not contested severability before us.  We 
adopt the analysis of the District Court and conclude that 
the statute is severable. 
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996 (3d Cir. 1993).  But should we conclude that even one of 
the Plaintiffs has an injury regarding a specific provision of 
Section 1414, we need not examine the effect of that 
provision on the other Plaintiffs.  See Montalvo-Huertas v. 
Rivera-Cruz, 885 F.2d 971, 976 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Where 
coplaintiffs have a shared stake in the litigation – close 
identity of interests and a joint objective – the finding that one 
has standing to sue renders it superfluous to adjudicate the 
other plaintiffs‟ standing.”). 
Defendants deny Plaintiffs have an injury in fact as 
regards the expenditure and special needs provisions.
12
  So 
we must determine whether any of the Plaintiffs have been 
subject to actual enforcement of the expenditure or special 
needs provisions or are likely to have these provisions 
                                              
12
 Though injury in fact is not disputed as to the other 
provisions, we note that it appears from the record that 
there are Plaintiffs with standing to challenge those 
provisions.  Michael Bidzilya and William Algar can 
challenge the under-65 provision because they are over 
65 years old.  Mary Wagner can challenge the 50% 
repayment provision because the State sought repayment 
from her and has only suspended its collection attempt 
pending the outcome of this suit.  All plaintiffs can 
challenge the termination provision, as that is an 
enforcement clause applicable to any potential violations 
of Section 1414.  We therefore confirm our jurisdiction 
to consider challenges to those provisions. 
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enforced against them in the near future.  We conclude that 
Plaintiffs are indeed likely to have these provisions 
imminently enforced against them.  First, all Plaintiffs fall 
within the scope of these statutory provisions, such that 
Plaintiffs would be burdened by these provisions if they were 
enforced.  Second, DPW has stated that it intends to enforce 
all the requirements of the statute should it prevail.  This 
establishes an imminent injury in fact. 
Defendants believe that Plaintiffs lack an injury in fact 
as to the special needs provision because they “have not 
produced a single class member who can plausibly claim to 
be at risk of being denied access to a pooled trust under” that 
provision.  (Appellants‟ Principal Br. at 14)  Defendants point 
to cases where they have approved exceptionally large 
trusts,
13
 implicitly arguing that they will not enforce the 
“special needs” requirement except in egregious cases.  They 
believe Plaintiffs lack an injury in fact unless one of the 
Plaintiffs presents such an egregious case.  Similarly, because 
Plaintiffs have failed to point to a specific expenditure that 
Defendants have disapproved or threatened to disapprove, 
Plaintiffs supposedly lack an injury in fact as to the 
expenditure provision. 
But Defendants‟ position ignores the nature of these 
provisions.  Instead of being imposed on particular classes of 
                                              
13
 We note, though, that the Defendants do not commit 
themselves to continuing such a course.  Faced with an 
identical situation in the future, they could disallow such 
trusts. 
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individuals, these requirements are burdens on the nature of 
the trust itself, affecting all beneficiaries and trustees of 
special needs trusts.  With regard to the special needs 
provision, the Pennsylvania statute requires that the trust‟s 
existence be justified in relation to the “special needs” of the 
beneficiary.  It defines “special needs” as “items, products or 
services . . . related to the treatment of the beneficiary‟s 
disability.”  62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414(f).  This requires that the 
trust be justified in relation to the treatment of the 
beneficiary‟s disability.  Similarly, the expenditure provision 
requires “any expenditure from the trust” to “have a 
reasonable relationship to the needs of the beneficiary.”  62 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414(b)(3)(ii).  All special needs trusts are 
subject to these requirements.  Each of these provisions 
requires careful scrutiny of the trust, the beneficiary, and the 
beneficiary‟s ongoing needs, and therefore each provision 
imposes an ongoing burden on beneficiaries and trustees. 
 Plaintiffs are within the scope of the statute and 
therefore potentially affected by it.  By itself, this is not 
sufficient to demonstrate constitutional standing.  Normally, 
Plaintiffs would have the burden of demonstrating that there 
is an imminent threat of enforcement against them.  But here 
DPW has relieved Plaintiffs of that burden by stipulating that 
should it “prevail in this litigation, it will enforce all 
provisions of section 1414[.]”  Therefore, the threat of 
enforcement is sufficiently imminent that Plaintiffs have an 
injury in fact. 
Defendants also argue that should they prevail, they 
will not seek to terminate trusts, but rather seek to force their 
compliance with Section 1414.  (Appellants‟ Principal Br. at 
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15)  But it is unclear why this would deny Plaintiffs an injury 
in fact.  While terminating non-compliant trusts would surely 
be more draconian, forcing such trusts to comply with an 
allegedly illegitimate statute is, from the perspective of 
constitutional standing, no less an injury in fact. 
We hold that Plaintiffs have constitutional standing to 
challenge Section 1414. 
V.A.2 
Prudential standing requires:  (1) that a litigant assert 
his or her own legal interests rather than those of a third 
party; (2) that the grievance not be so abstract as to amount to 
a generalized grievance; (3) and that the Plaintiffs‟ interests 
are arguably within the “zone of interests” protected by the 
statute, rule, or constitutional provision on which the claim is 
based.  See Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 
2003).
14
  These requirements are clearly met in this case.   
                                              
14
 Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs‟ prudential 
standing.  Constitutional standing is clearly jurisdictional 
and must be considered even when the parties fail to raise 
the issue.  It is unclear whether prudential standing is 
similar.  There is significant disagreement among our 
sister circuits on whether objections to prudential 
standing can be waived.  Compare Cmty. First Bank v. 
Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 41 F.3d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir. 
1994) (not waivable); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 723 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (not 
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Plaintiffs are asserting their own interests as 
beneficiaries and trustees of trusts the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania is attempting to regulate.  Their grievance is not 
so abstract as to amount to a generalized grievance.  Rather, it 
is clear, distinct, and particular to their status as beneficiaries 
and trustees.  Finally, the “zone of interests” analysis parallels 
our later consideration of whether Plaintiffs have a private 
right of action.  Under Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 
273 (2002), to determine whether Congress intended to create 
a private right of action, we must look for “rights-creating 
language” clearly imparting an “individual entitlement,” with 
“an unmistakable focus on the benefitted class.”  Id. at 287.  
This test is both narrower than the zone-of-interests test and 
fully encompassed within its boundaries.  Thus, should we 
conclude that Plaintiffs have a private right of action, we must 
                                                                                                     
waivable); and Thompson v. Cnty. of Franklin, 15 F.3d 
245, 248 (2d Cir. 1994) (not waivable) with Bd. of Miss. 
Levee Comm’rs v. EPA, 674 F.3d 409, 417-18 (5th Cir. 
2012) (waivable); The Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cnty., 
Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1168 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(waivable); RK Co. v. See, 622 F.3d 846, 851-52 (7th Cir. 
2010) (waivable); City of L.A. v. Cnty. of Kern, 581 F.3d 
841, 845 (9th Cir. 2009) (waivable).  We have previously 
acknowledged the divide in our sister circuits, see UPS 
Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. USPS, 66 F.3d 621, 626 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1995), but we have thus far not decided the 
issue.  Because we hold that Plaintiffs have satisfied the 
requirements for prudential standing, we similarly 
decline to decide the issue now. 
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necessarily conclude that they satisfy the zone-of-interests 
test.  Since our later analysis does conclude that Plaintiffs 
have a private right of action, Plaintiffs have satisfied the 
zone-of-interests test.  We therefore hold that Plaintiffs have 
prudential standing to challenge Section 1414. 
V.A.3 
Ripeness requires “a substantial controversy, between 
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy 
and  reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment.”  Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 
270, 273 (1941).   
In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 
912 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1990), we concluded that the most 
important factors in determining whether a case is ripe are 
“the adversity of the interest of the parties, the conclusiveness 
of the judicial judgment and the practical help, or utility, of 
that judgment.”  Id. at 647.  Adversity requires opposing legal 
interests.  See id. at 648 (citing and quoting 10A C. Wright, 
A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2757, 
at 582-83 (2d ed. 1983)).  Such opposing interests are clearly 
present here, as Defendants have an obligation to enforce 
Section 1414, and Plaintiffs seek to evade its strictures.  
Conclusivity depends on the ability of a decision to “define 
and clarify the legal rights or relations of the parties.”  Id. at 
648.   A decision here would establish whether the statute can 
be enforced against the Plaintiffs, so it would define and 
clarify Plaintiffs‟ legal rights.  And declaratory judgments 
have utility because the clarity they bring enables “plaintiffs 
(and possibly defendants) [to] make responsible decisions 
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about the future.”  Id. at 649.  Here, a declaratory judgment 
will enable the Plaintiffs to make informed decisions about 
the administration of their trusts with a full understanding of 
Section 1414‟s effects. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs‟ claims are not ripe, 
but do not clearly state which factors they believe are lacking.  
They argue that because Section 1414 requires compliance 
with authoritative interpretations of the statute, because DPW 
is the agency charged with such interpretation, and because 
DPW has not released any such interpretations, the case is not 
ripe for decision.  They are incorrect. 
First, the statutory text has its own freestanding 
meaning and imposes requirements on trusts even without 
agency interpretation.  Defendants point to no authority 
requiring us to wait for an authoritative interpretation from a 
state agency before determining whether a state statute 
conflicts with federal law.  And to the extent the agency is 
pleading for a chance to interpret the statute more leniently 
than the statute‟s text might suggest, we question whether we 
can credit such an interpretation.  As the Supreme Court said 
in United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010):  
“We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely 
because the Government promised to use it responsibly.” 
Second, the stipulated facts cite multiple attempts to 
enforce provisions of the statute.  In one enforcement attempt, 
DPW denied Mary Wagner medical assistance because the 
trust agreement for The Family Trust did not comply with 
Section 1414.  Defendants claim this “ineligibility decision 
was withdrawn,” (Appellants‟ Reply Br. at 4) but that 
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explanation is at best incomplete, and at worst misleading, 
particularly coming as it does in a reply brief.  In fact, Mary 
Wagner, the trustee, and DPW entered into what is essentially 
a stay of the ineligibility determination pending resolution of 
this suit.    Should Plaintiffs‟ challenge fail, Mary Wagner and 
the trustee have agreed that the Commonwealth will be paid 
“up to fifty  (50%) percent of remaining funds in Mary 
Wagner‟s pooled account at her death[.]”  Obviously, Mary 
Wagner‟s interests remain adverse to those of the 
Commonwealth. 
Finally, the stipulated facts indicate that DPW has 
created and internally circulated a document addressing 
various provisions of the statute.  Defendants argue that these 
guidelines have not been used to disapprove any accounts or 
expenditures, but that is beside the point.  The document 
undermines Defendants‟ argument that they have not reached 
any conclusions on the scope and meaning of the statute.  For 
example, they have concluded that “luxury items” cannot be 
bought with trust funds and that “[n]o assets can be added 
after age 65.” 
The issues raised by Defendants will often be present 
in declaratory judgment cases.  Such actions are often brought 
specifically because legal rights and obligations are 
ambiguous or undefined.  Plaintiffs seek to clarify those legal 
rights and obligations.  We understand that DPW has been 
entrusted by the Pennsylvania Legislature with the duty of 
interpreting Section 1414 and we appreciate DPW‟s stated 
intent to interpret the statute reasonably.  But Plaintiffs have 
satisfied Step-Saver‟s requirements.  They are entitled to have 
Section 1414 examined in light of federal law and to have 
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their legal rights and obligations clarified.  We hold that 
Plaintiffs‟ claims are ripe for adjudication. 
V.B 
Defendants‟ central argument, cutting across both the 
private-right-of-action and the merits sections of their brief, is 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) does not mandate that the States 
exempt special needs trusts meeting its criteria.  Defendants‟ 
argument has been embraced by both the Second and Tenth 
Circuits.  See Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000).   
Meanwhile, the Eighth Circuit suggests in a passing reference 
that § 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory.  See Norwest Bank of N.D., 
N.A. v. Doth, 159 F.3d 328, 330 (8th Cir. 1998).  Having 
given careful consideration to Defendants‟ arguments and to 
the positions of our sister circuits, we conclude that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(d)(4) imposes mandatory obligations upon the 
States. 
Defendants‟ key point is that the beginning of the 
special needs exemption states:  “This subsection shall not 
apply to any of the following trusts[.]”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(d)(4) (emphasis added).  This language refers to the 
portion of the Medicaid statute requiring States to count trusts 
against eligibility.  It abrogates that section insofar as it 
applies to special needs trusts.  Both parties agree that this 
lifts the obligation levied upon the States by the trust-
counting provisions and says that the States do not have to 
apply the trust-counting provisions to qualifying special needs 
trusts.  But the provision does not specifically say that “Any 
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trusts meeting these requirements shall not be counted as 
available assets for determining Medicaid eligibility.” 
Defendants argue that this creates a “gap” where the 
States can legislate.   This was the Second Circuit‟s position 
in Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d at 256-57 (“Congress‟s negative 
command that (d)(3) „shall not apply‟ to the trusts referenced 
in (d)(4) does not, however, provide any guidance as to what 
rules shall apply to (d)(4) trusts.”).  Similarly, in Keith v. 
Rizzuto, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “Section 
1396p(d)(4) . . . provides an exception to a requirement.  
States accordingly need not count income trusts for eligibility 
purposes, but nevertheless may . . . opt to do so.”  212 F.3d at 
1193; see also Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 
1171, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying Keith to conclude 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) does not confer a private 
right of action). 
“[T]he intent of Congress is the „ultimate touchstone‟ 
of preemption analysis.”  Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 
115 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 485 (1996)).  And because “the best evidence of 
Congress‟s intent is what it says in the texts of the statutes,”  
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 
2002), we give controlling weight to the statutory text.  But 
we believe that focusing solely on the words “[t]his 
subsection” has caused Defendants and several courts to miss 
the forest for the trees. 
In enacting the trust provisions of OBRA 1993, 
Congress provided a comprehensive system for dealing with 
the relationship between trusts and Medicaid eligibility.  After 
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limited success with the Medicaid Qualifying Trusts 
provisions enacted in 1986, Congress made a deliberate 
choice to expand the federal role in defining trusts and their 
effect on Medicaid eligibility.  Evidence of this can be found 
throughout the Medicaid statute.  For example,  the current 
text of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) requires States to comply 
with “section 1396p of this title with respect to . . . treatment 
of certain trusts[.]”  Before OBRA 1993, the provision 
instructed States to “comply with the provisions of section 
1396p of this title with respect to liens, adjustments and 
recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid, and transfers 
of assets[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (1992).  It did not 
mention compliance with 1396p. 
Congress made a specific choice to expand the types of 
assets being treated as trusts and to unambiguously require 
States to count trusts against Medicaid eligibility.  Its primary 
objective was unquestionably to prevent Medicaid recipients 
from receiving taxpayer-funded health care while they 
sheltered their own assets for their benefit and the benefit of 
their heirs.  But its secondary objective was to shield special 
needs trusts from impacting Medicaid eligibility.  And the 
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of giving full 
effect to all of Congress‟ statutory objectives, as well as the 
specific balance struck among them.  See Rodriguez v. United 
States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (“Deciding what 
competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the 
achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of 
legislative choice-and it frustrates rather than effectuates 
legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever 
furthers the statute‟s primary objective must be the law.”). 
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Congress‟ intent was not merely to shelter special 
needs trusts from the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3).  It 
was to shelter special needs trusts from having any impact on 
Medicaid eligibility.  This conclusion is rooted in the 
statutory text.  If Congress had intended to do as the 
Defendants insist – provide an exception to the trust-counting 
rules through which the States were free to do as they wish – 
it seems unlikely that Congress would use the word “shall” in 
its command that “[t]his subsection shall not apply.”  Any 
number of constructions would have been more amenable to 
the Defendants‟ position.  For example, Congress could have 
said:  “States are not required to apply this subsection to any 
of the following trusts.”  Congress is not required to use any 
particular magic words, but its choice of an imperative like 
“shall” does give evidence of its intent. 
Even more important is the structure of the asset-
counting rules.  While Defendants focus on the specific 
mandate-and-exception structure of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(3) 
and (4), both of these sit within a complex and comprehensive 
system of asset-counting rules.  Congress rigorously dictates 
what assets shall count and what assets shall not count toward 
Medicaid eligibility.  State law obviously plays a role in 
determining ownership, property rights, and similar matters.  
Here Congress has not only provided a comprehensive system 
of asset-counting rules, it has actually legislated on this 
precise class of asset.  Defendants argue that Congress left a 
gap or an unprovided-for case with regard to these trusts.  But 
with such a rigorous system, it seems clear that Congress 
intended to create a purely binary system of classification:  
either a trust affects Medicaid eligibility or it does not. 
35 
 
Finally, while this shades into our preemption analysis, 
it is important to note that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) basically 
provides a federal definition for what constitutes a special 
needs trust.  Through this statutory provision, Congress has 
set the boundaries for what will be considered a special needs 
trust under federal law.  Pennsylvania‟s Section 1414 adds 
requirements to this definition.  As our preemption analysis 
will demonstrate, States are not free to rewrite congressional 
statutes in this way. 
For these reasons, rooted in the text and structure of 
the Medicaid statute, we respectfully disagree with the 
conclusion of the Second and Tenth Circuits.  We hold that in 
determining Medicaid eligibility, States are required to 
exempt any trust meeting the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(d)(4).
15
 
V.C.1 
To find a private right of action under Section 1983:  
(1) the statutory provision must benefit the plaintiffs with a 
right unambiguously conferred by Congress; (2) the right 
cannot be so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement 
would strain judicial competence; and (3) the statute must 
impose a binding obligation on the States.  See Blessing v. 
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 329 (1997); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 
536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002).  Defendants challenge the first and 
                                              
15
 Trusts are, of course, required to abide by a State‟s 
general law of trusts, the effects of which will be 
discussed in greater detail in our preemption analysis. 
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third parts of this test.  We conclude that Plaintiffs have a 
private right of action under Section 1983. 
Medicaid provides eligible individuals with the 
statutory right to receive medical assistance and to receive it 
with reasonable promptness.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), 
1396a(a)(10) & 1396d(a).  Our Court has already concluded 
that Medicaid provides a private right of action under Section 
1983 for interference with this right.  See Sabree ex rel. 
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Plaintiffs have a right to receive reasonably prompt medical 
assistance so long as they meet the eligibility requirements as 
those requirements are defined by federal law.  Plaintiffs 
allege that Section 1414 changes the eligibility requirements 
for medical assistance, contrary to federal law.   Thus, it 
interferes with Plaintiffs‟ right to receive medical assistance.  
Plaintiffs therefore have a cause of action under Section 1983. 
It is a closer question whether the Trust Plaintiffs have 
a private right of action here.  To be sure, they do not have a 
right to receive medical assistance.  We nonetheless conclude 
that the Medicaid statute confers a private right of action 
upon the Trust Plaintiffs. 
Under Gonzaga University v. Doe, we must look for 
“rights-creating language” clearly imparting an “individual 
entitlement,” with “an unmistakable focus on the benefitted 
class.”  536 U.S. at 287.  In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court 
contrasted the “individually focused terminology  of Title VI 
(„No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination‟)” 
with FERPA‟s mandate that the Secretary of Education 
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withhold funds from institutions violating its provisions.  Id. 
at 287. 
Based on Gonzaga, at least two provisions of the 
Medicaid statute confer rights upon the trusts.  First, 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) says that the trust-counting rules “shall 
not apply to” special needs trusts.  This  parallels the 
language from Title VI and Title IX (“No person . . . shall . . . 
be subjected to discrimination”)  that the Court has held to 
create individual rights.  See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284, 287.  
Second, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) instructs that “[a] State 
plan for medical assistance must . . . comply with the 
provisions of section 1396p of this title with respect to . . . 
treatment of certain trusts[.]”  This parallels the language 
from 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)
16
 already held by Sabree to 
confer an individual right.  In fact, they are both part of a list 
of requirements that Congress concluded “must” be met by a 
“State plan for medical assistance[.]”  While the instruction to 
comply is directed at the State, the right to have the State 
comply is directed at those affected by noncompliance.  See 
Sabree, 367 F.3d at 190.  In the case of Section 1396a(a)(8), 
individual rights were conferred upon those eligible for 
Medicaid.  In the case of Section 1396a(a)(18), individual 
rights are conferred upon the trusts. 
                                              
16
 “A State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide 
that all individuals wishing to make application for 
medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity 
to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with 
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals[.]”  42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). 
38 
 
Defendants‟ counterargument is that the special needs 
exemptions to the trust-counting rules (42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(d)(4)) are not mandatory.  In order to confer a 
private right of action, the statute “must be couched in 
mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.”  Blessing, 520 U.S. 
at 341.  Otherwise it does not “unambiguously impose a 
binding obligation on the States” such that plaintiffs can seek 
its enforcement through Section 1983.  Because we have 
already concluded that the special needs exemptions are 
mandatory, we must reject this argument. 
We hold, consistent with our opinion in Sabree, that 
the Individual Plaintiffs have a private right of action to 
enforce the application of the special needs exemptions.  We 
further hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(18) unmistakably confer a similar right on the 
Trust Plaintiffs. 
 
V.C.2 
We also conclude that the Supremacy Clause provides 
Plaintiffs with an independent basis for a private right of 
action in this case.
17
  Supreme Court precedent establishes 
                                              
17
 The District Court concluded that this issue could not 
be bypassed – despite finding a private cause of action 
under Section 1983 – because Plaintiffs supposedly 
challenge a specific use of the 50% payback provision 
solely under the Supremacy Clause.  While that may be 
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that the Supremacy Clause creates an independent right of 
action where a party alleges preemption of state law by 
federal law.  See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 
n.14 (1983) (“A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from 
state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-
empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a 
federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.”).  We acknowledged as 
much in St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n v. Gov’t 
of the U.S. V.I., 218 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] state 
or territorial law can be unenforceable as preempted by 
federal law even when the federal law secures no individual 
substantive rights for the party arguing preemption. . . . The 
Supreme Court has recognized that such a challenge presents 
a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.”).18 
Our opinion in Gonzalez v. Young, 560 F.2d 160, 166 
(3d Cir. 1977), is not to the contrary.  There we concluded 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1343 did not confer jurisdiction over a claim 
                                                                                                     
an overly narrow construction of the Complaint, the 
Supremacy Clause does provide a cause of action. 
 
18
 It is worth noting, though, that our statement in St. 
Thomas-St. John is only dicta, because the Supremacy 
Clause has no direct role in a conflict between federal 
law and territorial law.  Such a conflict presents no 
competition between state and federal sovereignty. 
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that the federal welfare program preempted New Jersey law.  
But here Section 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction 
so long as there is a “civil action[] arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1331.
19
  In any event, Shaw post-dates Gonzalez and 
commands that jurisdiction and a cause of action are present 
here. 
  We are compelled to hold that the Supremacy Clause 
provides a private right of action here.
20
 
                                              
19
 Section 1331 could not be used in Gonzalez as the 
version in effect at the time had an amount-in-
controversy requirement of $10,000.  See Gonzalez, 560 
F.2d at 164.  That requirement was removed in 1980.  
Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (Dec. 1, 1980). 
 
20
 When this case was briefed, the Supreme Court was 
poised to revisit this issue in Douglas v. Independent 
Living Center of Southern California, 565 U.S. __, No. 
09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22, 2012).  But though 
the question on which the Court granted certiorari 
squarely presented the issue, the Court expressly declined 
to “address whether the Ninth Circuit properly 
recognized a Supremacy Clause action to enforce this 
federal statute[.]”  Id. at *6.  Instead, the Court remanded 
for consideration of agency determinations issued during 
the pendency of the appeal.  See id. at *2.  The Court 
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V.D 
Our preemption analysis must necessarily examine 
each individual component of the Pennsylvania statute to 
determine whether it conflicts with the Medicaid statute.  But 
we begin by determining whether Congress had an 
overarching intent in enacting the trust-counting provisions 
and the special needs exemptions. 
The basic principles of a preemption analysis are 
familiar.  First, “the intent of Congress is the „ultimate 
touchstone‟ of preemption analysis.”  Farina, 625 F.3d at 115 
(quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).  Second, “we „start[] 
with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to 
displace state law.‟”  Id. at 116 (quoting Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).  Third, when we are 
dealing with Spending Clause legislation, we require 
Congress to speak “unambiguously,” because such legislation 
is in the nature of a contract between Congress and the States, 
                                                                                                     
reached this decision over the strong dissent of the Chief 
Justice, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.  
The dissenting justices would have concluded that 
“[w]hen Congress did not intend to provide a private 
right of action to enforce a statute enacted under the 
Spending Clause, the Supremacy Clause does not supply 
one of its own force.”  Id. at *11  (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).  Although the Supreme Court is free to 
revisit Shaw if it so desires, we are not.  Shaw is binding 
precedent unless and until it is abrogated by the Supreme 
Court. 
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and the States are entitled to know the conditions under which 
they are accepting.  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
Bearing these principles in mind, we discern an 
overarching intent behind the trust exemptions.  First, 
Congress intended to mandate the exemption of special needs 
trusts from the trust-counting rules.  We explained our 
reasoning for this conclusion in Section V.B.   
Second, Congress intended that special needs trusts be 
defined by a specific set of criteria that it set forth and no 
others.  We base this upon Congress‟ choice to provide a list 
of requirements to be met by special needs trusts.  The 
venerable canon of statutory construction – expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius – essentially says that where a specific 
list is set forth, it is presumed that items not on the list have 
been excluded.  See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 
514 U.S. 779, 793 n.9 (1995) (noting that application of 
expressio unius leads to the conclusion that the qualifications 
for office expressed in the Constitution are the sole 
requirements and other requirements cannot be imposed); 
Waggoner v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(applying expressio unius to a list of requirements and 
concluding that expression of the “extreme hardship” 
requirement forecloses conclusion that additional 
requirements exist beyond “extreme hardship”).  Absent an 
explicit statement or a clear implication that States are free to 
expand the list, expressio unius leads us to conclude they are 
not. 
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Third and finally, while Congress did not intend to 
allow additional burdens targeted specifically at special needs 
trusts, there is no reason to believe it abrogated States‟ 
general laws of trusts or their inherent powers under those 
laws.  There is necessarily some tension between this 
conclusion and the bar on States adding requirements.  For 
example, even application of the trustee‟s traditional duty of 
loyalty – to “administer the trust solely in the interests of the 
beneficiaries[,]” 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7772(a) – could be 
considered an extra requirement.  But we reject the 
conclusion that application of these traditional powers is 
contrary to the will of Congress.  After all, Congress did not 
pass a federal body of trust law, estate law, or property law 
when enacting Medicaid.  It relied and continues to rely on 
state laws governing such issues. 
These three conclusions – that the special needs 
exemptions are mandatory, that Congress‟ stated 
requirements for special needs trusts are exclusive, and that 
States retain their traditional regulatory authority – guide our 
preemption analysis here.
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 We note briefly that we see no reason for application 
of the “no more restrictive” rule (NMR rule) in this case.  
The NMR rule bars States – in determining whether the 
medically needy are eligible for Medicaid – from using a 
methodology that is “more restrictive than the 
methodology which would be employed under the 
supplemental security income program.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III).  While the NMR rule was 
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V.D.1 
Pennsylvania‟s 50% retention provision provides: 
[U]pon the death of the beneficiary or upon the 
earlier termination of the trust, the department 
and any other state that provided medical 
assistance to the beneficiary must be reimbursed 
from the funds remaining in the trust up to an 
                                                                                                     
heavily relied upon by the District Court and its 
application has been extensively briefed, using the NMR 
rule without consideration of Congress‟ underlying intent 
is like using a yardstick without knowing where to start 
measuring.  Regardless, the more direct approach is to 
apply Medicaid standards in resolving this case.  As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, the Medicaid statute 
requires the States to base assessments of financial need 
(for both categorically needy and medically needy 
individuals) on resources “available” to the recipient.  
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981).  
The trust provisions are deliberately worded to require 
that States consider money held in trust “available” 
unless the trust is protected by one of the exemptions.  42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3).  (Use of Medicaid standards 
instead of SSI standards may be a distinction without a 
difference.  The SSI standards incorporate by reference 
the Medicaid trust exemptions.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1382b(e)(5).  But given the complexity of Medicaid, 
we seek to simplify the analysis in any way we can.) 
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amount equal to the total medical assistance 
paid on behalf of the beneficiary before any 
other claimant is paid:  Provided, however, That 
in the case of an account in a pooled trust, the 
trust shall provide that no more than fifty 
percent of the amount remaining in the 
beneficiary‟s pooled trust account may be 
retained by the trust without any obligation to 
reimburse the department. 
62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414(b)(3)(iii).  The Medicaid statute, 
meanwhile, includes the following language: 
To the extent that amounts remaining in the 
beneficiary‟s account upon the death of the 
beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the 
trust pays to the State from such remaining 
amounts in the account an amount equal to the 
total amount of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan 
under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iv).  These two provisions are 
irreconcilable.  We conclude that Congress intended to permit 
special needs trusts – at the discretion of the trust – to retain 
up to 100% of the residual after the death of the disabled 
beneficiary.  We therefore hold the repayment provision of 
Section 1414 preempted by federal law.
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 Defendants argue that there is a particular justiciability 
problem with the 50% repayment provision, as the 
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 Plaintiffs argue that the Medicaid provision leaves it to 
the trust to decide how much – if any – money should be 
provided to the State to reimburse it for Medicaid expenses.  
We agree.  This construction accords with the statutory text 
and Congress‟ evident solicitude for these pooled trusts 
(evident by the fact that there is a special category of 
exemption for them.)  Retaining the residual enables the trust 
to cover administrative fees and other overhead without 
increasing charges on accounts of living beneficiaries  At the 
same time, should the trust attempt to pass the money to the 
deceased‟s estate, this provision acts as a safeguard to ensure 
                                                                                                     
Individual Plaintiffs supposedly have no interest in where 
the remainder goes after they die (as they have forfeited 
to the trust their right to the remainder) and Trust 
Plaintiffs do not have a “personal right” in the pooled 
trusts.  (Appellants‟ Principal Br. at 26. n.7)  We 
disagree.  The injury to the Individual Plaintiffs does not 
arise from the disposition of property after their death.  
Rather, it arises from imposing additional requirements 
on their existing trust.  If, for example, DPW reviews the 
trust agreement of an Individual Plaintiff and determines 
that the agreement is invalid for lack of a provision for 
repaying the State, DPW calls into question the validity 
of the Individual Plaintiff‟s trust and, by extension, their 
eligibility for medical assistance.  This is an injury in fact 
sufficient to confer standing upon the Individual 
Plaintiffs.  And for the reasons discussed above, we 
believe the relevant provisions of the Medicaid statute 
grant a private right of action to the Trust Plaintiffs. 
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that the State gets repaid.  See Joseph A. Rosenberg, 
Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities:  The 
Development of a Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. 
Pub. Int. L.J. 91, 132 (2000) (“To the extent the remaining 
balance in an individual trust account is retained by the 
pooled trust after the death of the beneficiary, the State is not 
entitled to be paid back.  However, any amounts that are not 
retained by the pooled trust must be used to reimburse the 
State for the cost of medical assistance provided to the 
beneficiary during his or her lifetime.”). 
 Defendants have not offered any reasonable alternative 
construction of the Medicaid provision.  Their principal 
argument is that the Medicaid statute makes no mention of 
who gets to decide the percentage retained by the trust.  But 
Plaintiffs‟ construction of the statute – which we find 
persuasive, particularly in the absence of a contrary 
construction from the Defendants – is that this is a protective 
provision, intended to shield the trust from repayment 
obligations.  Permitting the States to choose how much the 
trust can retain would eviscerate that protection.  While 
Pennsylvania seeks “only” 50% of the trust residual, States 
would be free to demand any amount they wished, with the 
possible exception of 100%, and the courts would be 
powerless to mediate these disputes.  Absent some statutory 
guidance, there is no reasonable way for us to say that 
demanding 75%, 85%, or even 99.9% of the residual is any 
less permissible than demanding 50%.  We cannot believe 
Congress would intentionally cripple its statute in that 
manner. 
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It is particularly noteworthy that this provision differs 
from the other three types of special needs trusts.  In enacting 
the trust-counting rules, Congress designated three types of 
exempted trusts in successive statutory paragraphs at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B), and (C).  Both the first and 
second exemptions, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) and (B), 
require repayment up to the total amount expended for 
medical assistance.  The pooled-trust provision, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(d)(4)(C), is the only one of the three exemptions that 
qualifies this repayment obligation and permits the trust to 
retain some portion of the residual.  This is strong evidence of 
congressional intent.  See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”).  
There is no question that Congress could have chosen 
to strike the balance differently, determining that the trust 
could retain some portion of the residual while partially 
repaying the State.  But Congress chose to strike the balance 
in favor of the trust.  It is important to remember that the 
residual here is not being passed to the deceased beneficiary‟s 
estate.  It is being retained by a charitable organization whose 
purpose is to operate special needs trusts for the benefit of the 
disabled.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(I) (requiring that a 
pooled trust be “established and managed by a non-profit 
association”).  To the extent any part of the residual is passed 
to the estate, States are free to seek repayment from those 
funds.  But Congress has given the trust discretion to 
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determine whether to retain the residual.  We hold the 
repayment provision of Section 1414 preempted by federal 
law. 
V.D.2 
The expenditure provision of Section 1414(b)(3)(ii) 
provides that “any expenditure from the trust must have a 
reasonable relationship to the needs of the beneficiary.”  62 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414(b)(3)(ii).  The Medicaid statute sets no 
restrictions on the purposes for which trust funds can be 
expended.  Thus, the reasonable relationship requirement of 
Section 1414(b)(3)(ii) transgresses congressional intent.  We 
hold it preempted by federal law. 
The Commonwealth is justifiably concerned with the 
potential for fraud and abuse.  While there is little if any 
evidence to demonstrate that the Trust Plaintiffs here have 
spent trust funds recklessly, it is always possible that trustees 
could do so.  But States are not without tools to prevent 
abuse.  The trust-counting rules are built atop the States‟ legal 
framework for trusts.  Special needs trusts are therefore 
subject to supervision by the courts and legal actions to 
enforce trustees‟ fiduciary duties.  And because pooled 
special needs trusts must be managed by non-profit 
organizations, they are similarly subject to the States‟ legal 
rules for non-profits.  We trust that these statutory tools are 
robust enough to curtail abuses.  But should States find these 
tools inadequate, they are free to petition Congress to change 
the Medicaid statute.  Should Congress be unresponsive, 
States retain the option of withdrawing from Medicaid. 
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V.D.3 
The special needs requirement of Section 1414(b)(2) 
attempts to restrict pooled special needs trusts to beneficiaries 
with “special needs that will not be met without the trust.”  62 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414(b)(2).  The Pennsylvania statute defines 
“special needs” as “those items, products or services not 
covered by the medical assistance program, insurance or other 
third-party liability source for which a beneficiary of a special 
needs trust or his parents are personally liable and that can be 
provided to the beneficiary to increase the beneficiary‟s 
quality of life and to assist in and are related to the treatment 
of the beneficiary‟s disability.”23  These limitations do not 
appear in the Medicaid statute, which only requires that 
individuals be “disabled.”24 
                                              
23
 The statute also provides examples:  “The term may 
include medical expenses, dental expenses, nursing and 
custodial care, psychiatric / psychological services, 
recreational therapy, occupational therapy, physical 
therapy, vocational therapy, durable medical needs, 
prosthetic devices, special rehabilitative services or 
equipment, disability-related training, education, 
transportation and travel expenses, dietary needs and 
supplements, related insurance and other goods and 
services specified by the department.”  62 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1414(f). 
 
24
 The definition of “disabled” for this purpose is given at 
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A):  “[A]n individual shall be 
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Defendants point to the flexibility of the term “quality 
of life” as support for their contention that this provision is 
not inconsistent with Medicaid‟s requirements.  Plaintiffs 
rightly note that the Pennsylvania statute requires both that 
the items will enhance the beneficiary‟s quality of life and 
that they be “related to the treatment of the beneficiary‟s 
disability.”  Congress did not include any requirement that 
proceeds from a special needs trust be used solely for 
treatment of the beneficiary‟s disability.  Starting from the 
assumption that Congress intended to exempt all legally 
constituted trusts meeting the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(d)(4) from counting against Medicaid eligibility, and 
did not intend to permit additional restrictions beyond those it 
specified, the special needs requirement of Section 1414(b)(2) 
transgresses congressional intent.  We hold it preempted by 
federal law. 
Defendants claim that this requirement, much like the 
“reasonable relationship” requirement, is needed to prevent 
abuse of the trusts and the purchase of luxury items.  But 
                                                                                                     
considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter 
if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical 
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than twelve months.”  
Additional provisions provide that disability requires 
consideration of all jobs for which an individual might be 
eligible and relax the definition of “disabled” for minors.  
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) & (C). 
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while preventing abuse is a laudable goal and one with which 
Congress may agree, that requirement is not reflected in the 
Medicaid statute.  And of course States retain their full 
complement of general trust and non-profit laws to combat 
waste, fraud, and abuse.  Should a State find these tools 
inadequate, it may petition Congress for statutory changes, or 
it may withdraw from Medicaid entirely. 
V.D.4 
The age provision of Section 1414(b)(1) attempts to 
restrict pooled special needs trusts to beneficiaries “under the 
age of sixty-five.”  62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414(b)(1).  Congress 
did not include an age restriction for pooled special needs 
trusts.  On that basis alone, the age restriction in Section 
1414(b)(1) transgresses congressional intent. 
Our conclusion is bolstered by a close examination of 
the other trust exemptions (for non-pooled trusts).  In 
enacting the trust-counting rules, Congress designated three 
types of exempted trusts in successive statutory paragraphs at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B), and (C).  Only the first 
exemption, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), is restricted to “an 
individual under age 65[.]”  The other two exemptions – 
including pooled special needs trusts at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(d)(4)(C) – contain no similar language.  This is 
strong evidence of congressional intent not to impose an age 
restriction on pooled special needs trusts.  See Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
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the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).  And, indeed, 
Defendants conceded at oral argument that if we held 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) to be mandatory and binding, the age 
restriction must fall.  We agree, and hold the provision 
preempted. 
We note here that Defendants were attempting to 
protect elderly beneficiaries of special needs trusts from 
potentially invalidating (at least temporarily) their Medicaid 
eligibility.  Through a quirk of the Medicaid statute, elderly 
individuals (65 and over) transferring assets into a pooled 
trust are made ineligible for Medicaid for a period of time.  
See Rosenberg, supra, 10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. at 134-35 & 
n.234 (discussing operation of the penalty).  Before the 
District Court, Defendants argued that this was a “drafting 
error” by Congress.  They may well be correct.25  But this is 
not a mere “scrivener‟s error” that we can correct judicially.  
Congress could have rationally concluded that the benefits of 
making special needs trusts available to elderly individuals 
outweighed the burden of the penalty.   As it stands, 
congressional intent – as exemplified by the text of the statute 
– is clear.  The Commonwealth‟s goal may be laudable, but if 
Congress perceives a problem, Congress will have to fix it. 
                                              
25
 Professor Rosenberg‟s article notes that advocates who 
lobbied Congress for the trust exceptions have expressed 
their belief that the lack of an age restriction was a 
“technical drafting error, created when the provision was 
divided into separate sections to accommodate the 
retention of the remainder by the pooled trust.”  
Rosenberg, supra, 10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. at 129. 
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V.D.5 
The enforcement provision of Section 1414(c) states:  
“If at any time it appears that any of the requirements of 
subsection (b) are not satisfied or the trustee refuses without 
good cause to make payments from the trust for the special 
needs of the beneficiary and, provided that the department or 
any other public agency in this Commonwealth has a claim 
against trust property, the department or other public agency 
may petition the court for an order terminating the trust.”  62 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1414(c).  The District Court held this 
provision preempted, but we believe it is a reasonable 
exercise of the Commonwealth‟s retained authority to 
regulate trusts.  We therefore hold that the enforcement 
provision is not preempted by federal law. 
The pooled special needs trust is a unique type of trust.  
It is one legal entity, but with many separate beneficiaries, 
each having a claim over a specific “account” within the trust.  
It is entirely reasonable for the Commonwealth to seek a 
method of enforcement tailored to this legal entity.  Assume, 
for example, that the non-profit trustee has a dozen accounts 
within the trust.  Eleven of those twelve accounts it manages 
well.  But for one of those accounts, it breaches the sole 
benefit requirement and makes distributions of account funds 
to relatives and friends of the disabled beneficiary, or – even 
worse – to its own employees.  It is the nonprofit that is at 
fault, and the nonprofit that can no longer be trusted to 
manage any of the accounts.  It is entirely reasonable for the 
Commonwealth to seek cancellation of the entire trust. 
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Pennsylvania‟s general trust law contains numerous 
provisions for protecting the trust and the interests of its 
beneficiaries.  For example, Pennsylvania law imposes duties 
of loyalty, impartiality, prudent administration, and prudent 
investment.  See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 7772, 7773, 7774, 
7203.  These duties may be enforced by a court when the 
court‟s jurisdiction is “invoked by an interested person or as 
provided by law” and the proceeding may “relate to any 
matter involving the trust‟s administration.”  20 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 7711.  The court‟s authority includes the power 
to remedy breaches of trust, remove the trustee, or terminate 
the trust.  See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  §§ 7781, 7766, 7740.2.  
Should the beneficiary be incapable of protecting his or her 
own interests, the Commonwealth may ask a court to appoint 
a guardian capable of bringing actions on the beneficiary‟s 
behalf.  See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5511. 
Because pooled trusts are required to be managed by 
non-profit organizations, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(i), 
Pennsylvania is also free to employ its general laws regarding 
nonprofits.  Among other things, these laws regulate the 
formation of non-profit corporations, see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 5301-5311; they set forth the powers and duties of 
non-profit corporations, see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5501-
5589; and they hold directors to a duty of care, see 15 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5712. 
Obviously, Pennsylvania cannot use the enforcement 
provision of Section 1414 to terminate trusts for violating 
other provisions we hold to be preempted.  But we see no 
reason why it cannot use this section to enforce its general 
trust laws or provisions like the sole benefit requirement. 
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In briefing and at oral argument, Defendants have 
expressed an intent not to cancel entire trusts because of a 
single account‟s transgressions.  We agree that innocent 
beneficiaries should not be punished for the transgressions of 
their trustee or their fellow account holders.  We appreciate 
Defendants‟ intent to apply this provision reasonably, and we 
trust that they will do so.  Should any individual enforcement 
action infringe on the rights of a trust or a disabled 
beneficiary, those individuals remain free to bring an as-
applied challenge to the statute.  But we cannot hold the 
enforcement provision categorically preempted, and we 
therefore vacate that portion of the District Court‟s opinion. 
V.D.6 
The District Court addressed a number of other issues 
in its opinion.  It concluded that the surviving portions of 
Section 1414 were severable and could stand on their own.  It 
granted Plaintiffs‟ request for class certification, but narrowed 
the class on the basis of its conclusion that no Plaintiff 
adequately represented individuals with trusts created prior to 
2000, when the SSI and Medicaid standards for trust 
treatment were different.  It concluded that The Family Trust 
could not adequately represent the class.  Finally, it appointed 
class counsel.  None of these decisions are challenged by the 
parties.  We affirm them in all respects. 
VI 
We conclude that Plaintiffs‟ case is justiciable and 
they have a private right of action under both Section 1983 
and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.  On the merits 
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of Plaintiffs‟ challenge, we conclude that the District Court 
was correct in its determination that Section 1414‟s 50% 
repayment provision, “special needs” provision, expenditure 
provision, and age restriction are all preempted by federal 
law.  However, we conclude that the enforcement provision 
of Section 1414 – when used to enforce provisions not 
otherwise preempted by federal law – is a reasonable exercise 
of the Commonwealth‟s retained authority to regulate trusts.  
We will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
